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The Navy Information Warfare Community (IWC) provides a vital, sophisticated 
capability to address increasingly dynamic and unpredictable threats around the world. 
The problem is, the same skills and capabilities that make IWC personnel so valuable to 
the Navy also make them valuable to myriad firms in industry and organizations 
elsewhere beyond the Services. Moreover, such skills and capabilities are directly 
transferrable to industry. As a result, many talented information warriors are leaving the 
Service at the midpoints of their military careers. Indeed, nearly half of our study 
participants indicate that they are likely to leave the Service when the next opportunity 
arises. 
Further, unlike other Navy communities (e.g., Aviation, Nuclear), in which clear 
career guidance and well-established incentives (e.g., bonus and retention pay) are in 
place, the comparatively inchoate IWC does not appear to benefit similarly. A number of 
our IWC participants indicate that career guidance is inadequate, for instance, and some 
remain uncertain what to do next. Alternatively, other participants appear to understand 
what needs to be done next, but they express frustration at the limited number of 
opportunities for milestone tours and command. 
Given the unique nature of the IWC, it has not been entirely clear what “talent” 
means in this community. Through this grounded study, however, we describe how talent 
is a highly situated and nuanced concept—far from general and monolithic—that is 
aligned with a person’s knowledge and capability within an organization setting. Indeed, 
we identify what constitutes talent in the IWC: IT technical knowledge and the 
competence that it enables are fundamental, but we find nuanced differences between the 
cyber warrior and information communicator tribes. For the cyber warriors, IT technical 
knowledge and the ability to take effective actions within cyberspace are central to talent. 
For the information communicators, technical system knowledge and the ability to 
communicate within the organization are key. For both tribes, talent does not appear to 
correlate positively with rank. 
Moreover, we articulate why some talented people choose to leave the Navy 
while others choose to stay in: The enjoyment of one’s work is paramount, but we find 
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nuanced differences between the cyber and communicator tribes. For the cyber warriors, 
who appear to enjoy their cyber jobs especially much, being able to specialize and 
continue with cyber jobs seems likely to keep them in the Navy, whereas the requirement 
to generalize and rotate into less enjoyable jobs seems likely instead to push them into the 
civilian sector. For the communicators, the opportunity to either specialize or reach 
command seems key to keeping them in the Navy, whereas if unable to do either, they 
seem likely instead to leave for civilian jobs. For both tribes, situated characteristics such 
as motivational versus toxic leaders and quality of life issues must balance with other 
motivational and dissatisfying factors. 
Thus, we identify four significant retention risks: 1) Rotation out of cyber (and 
other enjoyable, specialized) jobs, 2) generalization through job breadth, 3) dearth of 
command opportunities, and 4) repeated exposure to toxic leaders. We then outline 
recommendations for retaining IWC talent. One recommendation is to propose an 
alternate career path for talented officers who do not seek command, one that would 
enable such officers to “homestead” in cyber and other jobs as specialists instead of 
generalists. This could potentially address the first two retention risks directly, and it 
could have an indirect effect on the third by reducing the amount of competition for the 
limited number of milestone and command billets. Another recommendation could 
consider breaking some very large commands into smaller parts, which could 
accommodate more officers seeking command. The final recommendation proposes to 
include command climate survey results on leaders’ fitness reports; to identify talented 
IWC personnel; and to grant them limited access to more-senior officers above their 
direct superiors. 
Of course, much work would be required to implement recommendations along 
these lines, and it is unclear what impact they would have upon the detailing process, 
morale, perceived fairness, recruiting, chain of command, and other areas. Hence we 
leave the answers to such questions as topics for future research. Nonetheless, they offer 
potential to help to keep talented information warriors from leaving the Navy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Navy Information Warfare Community (IWC) provides a vital, sophisticated 
capability to address increasingly dynamic and unpredictable threats around the world. 
These consummate professionals are both producers and consumers of information, and 
they play a critical role in collecting, processing, exploiting and disseminating 
information of all types, using a powerful array of diverse technologies ranging from 
terrestrial computer networks to satellites in space. Arguably no other warfare specialty 
in the Navy could complete its missions effectively without the IWC, and with the advent 
and proliferation of cyber operations, information warriors are conducting strategic and 
tactical, offensive and defensive missions of their own. 
Effective performance in the IWC requires a somewhat unique set of skills and 
capabilities, which are distributed across a relatively broad collection of professional 
designators and specialties. Many such skills and capabilities are learned through formal 
education and job specific training, but most people say that the majority of key 
knowledge is learned on the job, through personal and professional experience, and even 
dependent upon innate capabilities and personality attributes. 
The problem is, the same skills and capabilities that make IWC personnel so 
valuable to the Navy also make them valuable to myriad firms in industry and 
organizations elsewhere beyond the Services. As a result, many talented information 
warriors are leaving the Service at the midpoints of their military careers. Network 
administrators, computer security specialists, technology consultants, and other relatively 
high level and high value jobs maintain strong demand for IWC talent, and many firms in 
industry and elsewhere offer higher—in some cases much higher—compensation levels 
than military jobs, generally without the need for periodic deployment and frequent 
relocation.  
Indeed, a “war for tech talent” (Rosenbush, 2016) is being waged in industry, with 
many companies fighting to attract and retain technical employees (Nash, 2016). Even 
fresh college graduates, with no experience, are commanding high starting salaries and 
generous incentives to switch employers, and many such young employees report 
receiving 20 calls each day from recruiters trying to persuade them to change jobs 
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(Dodge, 2016). This is not a complete surprise, however, for retention of information 
warriors has been problematic for a number of years (Linn, 2009), and the Chief of Naval 
Personnel expresses great concern about attrition (LaGrone, 2014). Although the 
metaphoric tide of attrition has been flowing against the Navy for several years 
(Snodgrass, 2014), its effect on the IWC’s future seems particularly ominous. 
Further, the IWC is comparatively new. The Information Dominance Corps (IDC) 
was created less than a decade ago and renamed “IWC” in 2016. Alternatively, other 
Navy communities (esp. Surface Warfare) have been in existence since the U.S. Navy’s 
inception over two centuries ago, and their predecessors can be dated back several 
millennia to the beginning of navies in general. Even naval aviation has been operating 
for roughly a century now. Hence the IWC lacks the history and experience of other 
Navy communities, and it is therefore less clear which selection, promotion and retention 
techniques are comparatively more versus less effective in the IWC than in other 
communities. For instance, unlike other Navy communities (e.g., Aviation, Nuclear), in 
which clear career guidance and well-established incentives (e.g., bonus and retention 
pay) are in place, the comparatively inchoate IWC  does not appear to benefit similarly. 
The IWC is also comparatively very heterogeneous. The community is comprised 
of five designators and corresponding professions: 1) 1800 – Oceanography, 1810 – 
Cryptologic Warfare, 1820 – Information Professional, 1830 – Intelligence, and 1840 – 
Cyber Warfare Engineer. Although all five professions work with information, and some 
reflect partially overlapping skill sets, many of the kinds of jobs performed and the kinds 
of education and training required remain quite different. This suggests that demands for 
information warrior talent in industry and beyond are likely to differ across professions 
also. Hence even if we were to introduce incentives along the lines of those noted above, 
they might have to vary—perhaps considerably—from one designator to the next. For 
instance, very little or no incentive may be required to retain oceanographers—based 
solely upon industry demand for their skills and capabilities—whereas the Navy may be 
unable to match the incentives offered for cyber warriors and information professionals 
that benefit from high industry demand. Even for this relatively small community, a one 
size fits all approach to IWC talent retention may be inappropriate. 
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Moreover, given this relatively new, heterogeneous and unique nature of the IWC, 
it’s not entirely clear what “talent” means in this community. Do the elements of talent 
for an oceanographer align well with those of a cyber warfare engineer, for instance? Is 
the demand for cryptologic warfare skills comparable to that for information 
professionals? Or does talent vary across designators and professions, and perhaps along 
the rank structure as well? Indeed, talent seems likely to be a highly situated and nuanced 
concept—far from general and monolithic—aligned with a person’s knowledge and 
capability within an organization setting. Until we can identify what constitutes talent, we 
will likely have difficulty differentiating between personnel with a lot versus a little of it, 
and hence we risk promoting and retaining the wrong people, while allowing—or even 
worse, encouraging—our best personnel to leave the Navy. 
Understanding talent represents the first step toward identifying and retaining the 
best IWC people before they leave the Service. This qualitative study addresses the issue 
directly through a three part research question: 1) What constitutes talent in the IWC? 2) 
Why do some talented people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to stay in? 3) 
How can we retain talent in the Navy? Eschewing the idea of using deduction and 
quantitative testing through one or more top-down theoretic models of talent—
approaches that presume a solid understanding of what talent is and how to measure it—
we choose instead to employ qualitative methods and build up a grounded understanding 
of IWC talent. Indeed, given the situated and nuanced nature of talent likely to exist, we 
look to develop and articulate an understanding of IWC talent by talking to people in the 
IWC directly. We all know the saying, “I know talent when I see it,” so we’re looking to 
understand what it is that IWC people see when it comes to talent. 
Likewise, instead of speculating about why some people are leaving the IWC and 
why others are deciding to stay in the Navy, we ask people in the IWC why they’re 
choosing or considering one path or another, and we ask people also about friends and 
colleagues of theirs, building up similarly a grounded understanding of what people are 
looking for or missing. This can be highly informative in terms of working to develop, 
apply and refine incentive systems, highlighting opportunities for Navy leaders to address 
talent and retention in the IWC. Further, the techniques illustrated through this study can 
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inform follow-on work to identify talent in other Navy communities, the results from 
which should generalize well and prove highly useful through comparison and contrast. 
This qualitative approach exhibits no prejudice or judgment against quantitative 
methods. Indeed, we are conducting a quantitative companion study in conjunction with 
this one. Every research method has its comparative strengths and weaknesses, which are 
known well. Quantitative methods offer the power of numbers and statistical analysis, for 
instance, and they are able to address large volumes of data, generally quite quickly. 
Internal validity and reliability are relatively strong generally with quantitative methods, 
and researchers have an easier job of claiming to be “objective” or “rigorous.” However, 
quantitative methods have a difficult time addressing “how” and “why” research 
questions, and even many “what” questions can be troublesome. Notice that the three part 
research question centering this study includes a “what,” and “why” and a “how.” 
Metaphorically, quantitative methods are air campaigns. They strike quickly, 
generally from the top down, and can cover great areas, generally with comparatively 
little risk to the cyber warriors conducting the missions. However, they leave many 
targets untouched and are rarely effective alone. Campaigns in the Middle East over the 
past 15 years help validate this characterization. Indeed, experience suggests that lasting 
results require ground campaigns also, some aspects of which involve close, even house-
to-house combat. Metaphorically this is qualitative research: Getting on the ground and 
close to data, understanding them in depth, despite their inherently messy and 
disorganized nature. There is a time and place for both research methods. Given our 
interest in trying to define talent, the qualitative approach seems most appropriate at this 
stage of our study campaign. 
The balance of this report begins with some background information regarding 
the IWC, after which we elaborate on our qualitative research method. The bulk of the 
report articulates our qualitative data analysis and findings, which we summarize through 
a set of conclusions to complete the report. Three appendices are included with the 
qualitative instruments used in this study: A) recruitment script, B) background 
information questionnaire, and C) common interview questions.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
In this section we summarize very briefly the nature and composition of the IWC. 
We also summarize some relevant previous research on retention and talent.  
 
A. IWC NATURE AND COMPOSITION 
As noted above, the IWC is comparatively new and comprised of heterogeneous 
elements. Known until January 2016 as the Information Dominance Corps (IDC), the 
IWC was effectively created within the US Navy in 2009. It aligns the OPNAV N2 
(Intelligence), N6 (Communications Networks), and elements of N3 (N39, information 
and cyber operations) and N8 (unmanned systems programs and resources) into a unified 
organization (USNA, 2016).  
The IWC is led by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare 
(DCNO N2/N6). This represents a transition in the evolution of naval warfare, designed 
to elevate information as a main battery of naval warfighting capabilities and to establish 
naval prominence in intelligence, cyber warfare and information management. Indeed, 
technological advances make information both a formidable weapon and a constant 
threat, and information has emerged to represent a unique and distinct type of warfare 
(IDC, 2016).  
Some critical missions include the development and defense of intelligence, 
networks and systems; management of critical warfighting information; provision of 
command and control capabilities; and maintenance of information technological edge. 
Operationally, many of these missions are organized and conducted through the Fleet 
Cyber Command/10th Fleet (C10F). This represents the Navy component of the US Cyber 
Command, the Navy authority for cyber operations, the Navy service cryptologic 
element, and the operational authority and capability provider for information and cyber 
operations (USNA, 2016).  
Several, somewhat interrelated professions comprise the IWC. These include 
Intelligence, Information Warfare, Information Technology, Meteorology and 
Oceanography, and Space (IDC, 2016). Officer designators and corresponding 
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professions include 1800 – Oceanography, 1810 – Cryptologic Warfare, 1820 – 
Information Professional, 1830 – Intelligence, and 1840 – Cyber Warfare Engineer. 
Briefly, Oceanography personnel provide actionable information associated with 
meteorologic, climatologic, oceanographic and space environment observations and 
prognostic products (USNO, 2016). Cryptologic Warfare and Cyber Warfare Engineer 
personnel engage principally in computer network operations, which can be viewed 
conveniently in terms of network attack, defense and exploitation. Information 
Professional personnel deliver cyber ready systems and capabilities to the Fleet, and they 
operate Navy networks 24x7 to support the full spectrum of missions. Intelligence 
personnel in turn provide evaluated intelligence on adversaries’ capabilities and 
intentions to support planning and operations at all levels of warfare (USNA, 2016).  
The IDC’s five year (2012 – 2017) human capital strategy includes four primary 
goals: 1) manage the community as a total force; 2) build competencies through training, 
education and experience; 3) strategically integrate and align the workforce with mission 
and capability requirements; and 4) create a warfighting culture (NIDC, 2016). The 
vision is to “attract, develop, and retain a cohort of highly trained  and competent 
officers, enlisted, and civilian professionals who are fully integrated with the Navy’s 
combat forces, and delivering warfighting effects to Naval and Joint forces across the full 
spectrum of military operations” (NIDC, 2016: 6). The retention of talented personnel is 
clearly central to this strategy.  
 
B. RETENTION AND TALENT RESEARCH 
Retention in the Military has been studied for many decades (Singer & Morton, 
1969; Rocco et al., 1977; Hurlock & Montague, 1982; Cooke & Quester, 1992; Sullivan, 
1998; Christensen et al., 2002). A great many retention studies look backward, trying to 
make sense of historic data. Alternatively, some promising studies estimate retention 
models for officers in general (Parcell et al., 2003), in communities such as aviation and 
surface warfare (Parcell & MacIlvaine, 2005), and to assess diversity (Kraus, 2013). By 
developing models, such studies equip us to look prospectively, which is important. 
We’re working to address future talent losses, not simply to understand those that took 
place in the past. 
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One relatively recent study (Snodgrass & Kohlman, 2014) also looks 
prospectively. Instead of developing models from historic data, however, it grounds data 
by asking sailors directly about their plans in terms of staying in or leaving the Navy. 
This direct, prospective approach aligns well with our interest in developing a grounded 
understanding. Although the present study focuses more on talent than retention, there is 
clear complementation. 
Nonetheless, the idea of asking sailors directly is not new, for the Navy 
administers broad surveys routinely. For instance, until being discontinued several years 
ago, the ARGUS survey (Frith, 2007) would ask sailors about their quality of life and like 
questions. The Career Viewpoint Survey (CNP PAO, 2014), as another instance, 
similarly invites sailors to provide advance input regarding career decisions prior to key 
milestones (esp. end of duty obligated service, end of minimum service requirement, 
projected rotation date). Soliciting advance input seems important1, particularly if the 
Navy is sufficiently agile to do something to prevent talented people from leaving based 
on the results.  
Although such surveys are advertised as voluntary and confidential, it is unclear 
whether sailors have complete trust in the confidentiality of an official Navy system or 
whether they feel that their inputs matter (Anonymous, 2015). As explained in the next 
section, our approach of conducting interviews anonymously—for research purposes—
and destroying any personally identifiable information, helps to bridge the confidentiality 
barrier. Plus, we focus on one community at a time, with a more situated and 
concentrated lens, to help convey the potential visibility of our results. 
Given the relative newness of the IWC, this community has not received nearly as 
much retention attention as others (esp. Aviation, Surface Warfare), yet the IWC is 
critically important today. One, particularly relevant study (Linn, 2009) sheds some 
metaphoric light on information warriors specifically. Briefly, the study employs a survey 
instrument administered to Information Warfare officers (Cryptologic Warfare officers) 
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Like the Snodgrass & Kohlman (2014) study 
noted above, it is largely prospective in nature. Collecting data from students at the NPS 
aligns well with our interest in developing a grounded understanding as well. NPS 
                                                 
1 The Navy also administers the Career Viewpoint Exit Survey to members as they leave the service. 
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students have an opportunity to detach from the demands of everyday Fleet work and to 
reflect upon their careers—past and future—over 18 months or more while in school. 
This excerpt from Linn’s (p. xxii) report provides a summary:  
This survey shows that IW [Information Warfare] personnel believe that, on 
average, they can earn $25,100 more annually in an equivalent civilian job, and 
88% of those surveyed think a CSRB [Critical Skills Retention Bonus] would be 
helpful. When asked what were the biggest negative IW community retention 
factors, participants answered (in order of importance): civilian career 
opportunities, pay, IW leadership, family quality of life, and community direction. 
When asked what their own biggest negative retention factors were, participants 
answered (in order of importance): IW leadership, job advancement, education 
and training opportunities, pay, and career opportunities. This survey shows that, 
in addition to the monetary and nonmonetary solutions … the IW community 
might be able to improve retention further by focusing on improving IW 
leadership and community direction. … [Further,] shortages at O-5 are a direct 
result of too many prior enlisted officers who are not willing to stay in past 
retirement eligibility at the O-4 pay grade. While a CSRB may provide a short-
term solution, nonmonetary solutions should be considered to provide an increase 
in long-term retention. 
 
 This summary reflects several characteristics that may prove helpful with 
focusing our interviews. For instance, the perception that information warriors can earn 
more money by leaving the Navy than by staying in appears to be an important 
consideration to listen for, as will the idea of bonus pay (e.g., CSRB). The other 
“negative retention factors” (esp. leadership, job advancement, education and training 
opportunities, pay, career opportunities) appear likewise to be important considerations to 
listen for during interviews. Of course, in this present study, we’re not focusing on 
retention per se; rather, we’re concentrating in particular on retaining talent. 
 Further along these lines, the combination of relative newness and critical 
importance raises several comparisons with the advent of the Special Forces a few 
decades back (Breuer, 2015). Once someone joins the Special Forces—and is both 
trained and acculturated accordingly—it is rare for that person to rotate back into his or 
her home community. Quite the opposite, once trained, acculturated and experienced, that 
person generally spends the remainder of his or her military career in the Special Forces 
community, doing special forces work. This has potential to represent another important 
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consideration to listen for during interviews, as many information warriors may be forced 
to rotate out of jobs that they enjoy, and for which they train specifically. 
 Talent remains a challenging topic of study, however (Corley et al., 2015). A 
decade ago, research and consulting in this area were deemed problematic, with little data 
to support practitioner claims (Lewis & Heckman, 2006). Later review research noted 
significant progress but remaining issues with clear definitions and conceptual boundaries 
(Collings & Mellahi, 2009). This theme continues with more recent, extensive literature 
reviews (Tarique & Schuller, 2012). 
 Alternatively, a promising link established with knowledge management 
(Schroevers & Hendriks, 2012) helps to bring considerable academic rigor and successful 
practitioner experience to bear on the talent management topic, which is consistent with 
the Navy’s own knowledge management practices: “Knowledge management is the 
alignment of people and processes, enabled by technology” (DON CIO, 2016). This 
suggests strongly that talent is not some universal state or trait. Rather, it appears to be 
highly situated and nuanced—far from general and monolithic—that is dependent, for 
instance, upon the specific processes and technologies associated with the knowledge 
required for a person to exhibit talent. A “talented” person in one domain may represent 
an “untalented” person in another.  
Consider, for example, a Chess grand master—a truly talented person in the 
domain of Chess—who is left stranded in the middle of the Amazon Jungle. Without 
considerable training and experience with jungle survival, would such person even live 
through a single day? Likewise, take an Amazon Jungle native—a truly talented person in 
the domain of jungle survival—and enroll him or her in a Chess tournament. Without 
considerable training and experience with Chess, would such person even win a single 
game? Nissen (2014) goes further, explaining how the balanced interaction between 
people, processes, organizations and technologies is key. This perspective gives ever 
greater credence to our bottom-up, situated, grounded approach to understanding talent, 
beginning with the IWC:  Talent seems highly likely to differ tremendously across 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
In this section we elaborate on the research method. As noted in the introduction, 
we seek a direct, grounded understanding of IWC talent, so we employ very well-
established, grounded theory building methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Such methods equip us to build up an understanding inductively, from the 
data themselves, as opposed to relying upon a deductive, top-down model likely to be too 
general and coarse for our situated and nuanced concept talent. 
Moreover, it provides a well-accepted and systematic process for qualitative 
research, one that both guides and encourages repeated iteration of data collection and 
analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such repeated iteration is noted widely as key to grounding 
theory in the data of a qualitative study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and enables us to focus 
persistently on the IWC as a potentially unique and revelatory case to study (Yin, 1994). 
Results from this case study could then become even more useful in comparison with 
other Navy communities as complementary and contrasting cases, offering potential to 
elucidate insights unattainable through other research methods. 
The site selected for this study provides a rich environment for investigating IWC 
talent. We’re able to build upon prior work (Linn, 2009) that asked information warriors 
questions directly while they were studying at the NPS, and we’re able to solicit their 
prospective input regarding factors that could influence their future decisions to leave or 
stay in the Navy. Further, students at NPS (and like education institutions) have had an 
opportunity to detach from the demands of everyday Fleet work and to reflect upon their 
careers—past and future—over 18 months or more while in school. This enables study 
participants to think over the longer term, with fewer, everyday, pressing issues to 
contend with, which arguably serves very well our research purpose of understanding 
IWC talent as a revelatory case.  
Studying a revelatory case such as this represents theoretical sampling (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) and makes it suitable for analytic generalization (Yin, 1994). As 
demonstrated several years back in the context of strategic learning (Thomas et al., 2001: 
332), this calls in part for case selection of “a unique exemplar of a particular 
phenomenon to bring key dimensions to light.” Through study of this revelatory case, we 
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seek to bring the situated and nuanced nature of talent to light and to illuminate patterns 
with potential to inform retention. 
We employ three techniques for data collection: 1) document review, 2) strategic 
contact, and 3) interview. Briefly, document review provides important background 
information about the IWC. It also helps the Investigator to ask informed interview 
questions. Additionally, the Researcher has candid, confidential and sustained access to a 
Strategic Contact (i.e., a senior IWC officer). This naval officer is very experienced with 
military organizations and warfare processes in general, and he has considerable 
experience with cyber warfare in particular. This data-collection technique complements 
the other modes well. The Strategic Contact represents a ready source of military 
grounding and IWC perspective for consultation by the Investigator over the course of 
the study. 
Semi-structured interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 1995) comprise the central method 
for collecting our qualitative data. Although we do pose a small number of common 
questions to all participants, such questions are very open-ended, asking participants to 
tell about their experiences, feelings, observations and perceptions. We want to hear what 
the participants have to say—in their own words—not impose a bunch of theoretic, 
survey questions. Further, the interviews are conducted with probing (Nelson et al., 2000) 
and snowballing (Reich & Kaarst-Brown, 1999) techniques, and they continue until 
theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is reached. Because we focus in particular 
upon IWC talent, which is a relatively narrow topic, such saturation is reached after the 
first set of interviews, indicating sufficiency in terms of the sample frame summarized in 
Table 1. Each interview involves about one hour of oral interaction. 
It is important to highlight that this is a qualitative study, not a quantitative 
analysis, and our interest is much more toward theory building than theory testing. Hence 
we perform theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), not statistical sampling, and 
we pursue analytic generalization (Yin, 1994), not statistical generalization. As such, we 
adhere to very well-established procedures for qualitative data collection and analysis 
(Denzin, 1994). Such procedures do not dictate that we attempt to develop large, random 
samples.  
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Quite to the contrary, we look for a small sample that will be informative, that we 
can understand in-depth, and that will reveal both similarities and differences across 
participants. Additionally, we work deliberately to select participants who are likely to 
provide the kind of grounded data that we seek through interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 
1995). Toward these ends, our recruitment process emphasizes volunteer participants. 
The idea is that people who volunteer are likely have something to say, both positive and 
negative. This helps to ensure smooth, candid, flowing interviews, and it increases the 
likelihood of collecting data that are considered important by the participants, particularly 
as our interview techniques enable us to probe and home in on different topics across the 
various participants. This provides considerable contrast to mandatory surveys with 
standard questions. Our recruitment script is included in Appendix A for reference. 
 Nonetheless, we ensure that our sample frame includes at least one participant 
from each of the five IWC subcommunities, so we can collect data representing each 
perspective. We also ensure that we collect the same background information from each 
participant, so we have a common basis of comparison. This is the same background 
information used in a companion quantitative study, so we can compare qualitative and 
quantitative findings and results. The background information questionnaire is included 
in Appendix B for reference too. Plus, we further ensure that we ask at least some of the 
same interview questions to all participants, so we establish a base set of responses for 
comparison and contrast. Most study participants answer these questions in writing 
before their interviews. This streamlines the process and provides a good basis for asking 
other questions through probing and homing in on different topics across the various 
participants. The common set of interview questions is included in Appendix C for 
reference as well. 
 This purposeful sample concentrates on the two, mid-career organization levels 
(i.e., O3 & O4) noted by our Strategic Contact as particularly vulnerable at present and 
prone to problems with retention of talent. It includes participants representing each of 
the IWC’s five professions: Oceanography, Cryptologic Warfare, Information 
Professional, Intelligence, and Cyber Warfare Engineer. This enables us to look for 
similarities and differences—even within the IWC—across specialties, and it offers 
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potential to gain insight into alternate situations and nuances that may determine and 
affect corresponding talent.  
 
Table 1. Sample Frame 
Participant Rank Area NPS Curriculum 
P1601 O4 Cyber Warfare Computer & Information 
Science 
P1602 O4 Cryptologic Warfare Electrical Engineering 
P1603 O4 Oceanography Meteorology & 
Oceanography 
P1604 O4 Cryptologic Warfare Electronic Systems 
Engineering 
P1605 O3 Cryptologic Warfare Cyber Systems 
Operations 
P1606 O3 Information Professional Space Systems 
Engineering 
P1607 O3 Information Professional Space Systems 
Operations 
P1608 O3 Cryptologic Warfare Cyber Systems 
Operations 




Notice that all study participants are assigned currently (or were assigned 
recently) to the NPS for graduate education. As noted above, such NPS students are 
highly suitable for this study, because we’re collocated on campus with participants, who 
have an opportunity to detach from the demands of everyday Fleet work and to reflect 
upon their careers—past and future—over 18 months or more while in school. It is 
important to note that these are not the typical kinds of students used in much academic 
research. Indeed, far from the inexperienced college freshmen who participate in myriad 
psychology, marketing and other studies—the external validity of which is wholly 
suspect—most NPS students are mid-grade military officers (O3 & O4), with a decade or 
so of experience, many of whom come to the NPS directly from operational tours at sea, 
in war zones and like circumstances. These people know the Navy, and their 
incorporation in our sample frame enhances the external validity of this study greatly. 
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We also list the participants’ curricula of study. This helps with our theoretical 
sampling too. Earning a graduate degree represents a transitional act in many people’s 
careers, whereas others continue to specialize. In our sample, we find some people who 
make career pivots (e.g., IWC Intelligence background followed by graduate education in 
Cyber Systems and Operations), whereas others continue to specialize (e.g., IWC 
Oceanography background followed by graduate education in Meteorology & 
Oceanography). Including career pivots in addition to specializations enriches the study. 
Further, to enhance candid responses, and to reassure participants regarding 
anonymity, we choose not to use a tape or video recorder for interviews. Nonetheless, 
extensive notes are taken and summarized immediately following each interview, and 
collocation on the NPS campus enables the Investigator to follow up with interviewees 
where deemed necessary to clarify issues, to delve more deeply into topics of interest, or 
simply to verify facts, notes and comments recorded by the Investigator. 
In terms of coding, following Gioia et al. (1994) in part, we employ a multistage 
analytic approach to data collection, analysis and interpretation. In the primary stage, data 
collected and analyzed through the course of our interviews lead to first order coding 
(van Maanen, 1979), accomplished in a manner comparable to open coding (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990), which reflects terms used directly by organization participants. In other 
words, adhering to our grounded approach, we employ in vivo codes in the primary stage, 
using terms from the interviews themselves to code each passage and section. This helps 
to keep the coding process as close as possible to the data. Investigator reactions and 
analyses generate corresponding first order interpretations, which are meaningful to 
organization participants also. Where warranted by theoretical sampling, many first order 
interpretations may lead us to additional data collection and analysis at the same level, 
reflecting terms used directly by organization participants. This first order analysis 
grounds our interpretations in the data. 
In the secondary stage, we treat first order interpretations as “data” for second 
order analysis. This second order analysis augments its first order counterpart with 
theoretical insight and comparison, bringing in the investigator’s perspective that is 
informed by the literature, in a manner comparable to axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Gioia et al. (1994: 367) explain the benefits of using such a multistage approach. 
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They include exposing and integrating different aspects of the phenomena of study that 
are revealed separately through first versus second order analysis and interpretation.  
 
Although informant views can reveal the rich means or methods by which members can 
construct reality … they usually do not address the deep structure of experience. 
Similarly, although the researcher views tend to gloss the richness of lived experience, 
they place in bas-relief the dimensions or structure of phenomena. Because the knower 
and known are interdependent in this process of understanding, however, the most 
desirable approach is to triangulate insider and outsider views. 
 
As with the first interpretation stage, these second order interpretations may lead us in 
turn to collect and analyze additional data, to refine our first order interpretations, to 
augment our second order analysis, and so forth. This second order analysis bridges 
grounded data and interpretations with theory, and it helps us with the emergence of 
themes, accomplished in a manner comparable to selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). 
Additionally, regarding the Investigator’s background and biases, he is a tenured 
full professor of Information Science and of Management at the NPS, and although he is 
a Navy civilian, he comes to the study without operational military experience. This 
allows a relatively fresh look at the IWC, but one that includes considerable familiarity 
and experience with knowledge, talent and retention in industry and other sectors outside 
the Military. Nonetheless, after many years of conducting research in the military 
domain, the Investigator is far from a naïve outsider.  
Further, the Investigator comes to the study with no particular statement to make 
or point to prove. Rather, he comes seeking to understand IWC talent inductively, from a 
grounded perspective, and to elucidate possible approaches to retaining talented IWC 
personnel. Hence initial coding of data is conducted in a manner that lets the data speak 
for themselves and that uses study participants’ own terms. This helps to ensure that 
initial interpretations are both grounded firmly in the data and meaningful to organization 
participants. 
Finally, in addition to the well-accepted methods and techniques outlined above, 
the study also employs many of the proven tactics for qualitative research outlined by 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 262-276), which include taking a low profile, sampling 
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people with different views, triangulating across multiple data-collection techniques, 
multiple verification efforts, and seeking an emic perspective (Bernard, 1998). Such 
tactics serve to mitigate potential bias (e.g., stemming from a single Investigator). 
Moreover, repeated member checking (Denzin, 1994) is accomplished through periodic 
interaction with our Strategic Contact and follow up with the study participants. 
Comments pertaining to the interview summaries and findings are also received from the 
Strategic Contact and other participants in the study, and a preliminary summary of study 




























In this section we report the study results. We begin by summarizing the 
backgrounds of our study participants. We then summarize the key first order codes 
applied to our interview data. This is followed by second order analysis and the 
emergence of themes from our qualitative study. The section concludes with summary 
discussion. 
 
A. PARTICIPANT BACKGROUNDS 
In this section we summarize the backgrounds of our study participants. The 
corresponding data are collected through the background questionnaires noted above and 
included in Appendix A for reference. The participant background information is 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Participant Background Information 
 
 
We note here that the P16012 is an Army officer assigned currently at the NPS. 
We include this participant in the study at the recommendation of our Strategic Contact, 
because of his extensive, joint, operational cyber experience, and because we have no 
others to represent the 1840 – Cyber Warfare Engineer community. All other participants 
are Navy officers. In addition to including background information for each participant, 
across all 18 questions, we show the mean for quantitative data and mode for qualitative 
                                                 
2 All participants’ responses are anonymous, with unidentifiable codes used instead of names. 
Question P1601 P1602 P1603 P1604 P1605 P1606 P1607 P1608 P1609 Mean Mode
Date of Commissioning 2004 2003 1998 2005 2006 2008 2007 2009 2006 2005
Commissioning source OCS USNA USNA ROTC USNA USNA USNA STA OCS USNA
Prior Enlisted Y N Y N N N Y Y N N
Undergraduate College attended USNA USNA Minnesota USNA USNA USNA Colorado Florida USNA














Undergraduate GPA 3.2 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.5 2.8 3.3 3.8 3.3
Graduate degree MS Telecom MSEE MS METOC MSAE N
Rate at commissioning O1 O1 O1 O1 O1 O1 O1 O1 O1 O1
Designator at entry Signal Aviator Submarine SWO IW Aviator IP IW Submarine
Married, at commissioning date N N Y N N N Y Y N
Dependent children, at commissioning date N N N N N N Y Y N
Married, at current date Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Dependent children, at current date Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Current rate O4 O4 O4 O4 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3
Current designator 1840 1810 1800 1810 1810 1820 1820 1810 1830 1810



























Stay in or leave Navy Leave Stay Leave Stay Stay Stay Stay Leave Leave
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data at the right. For instance, our average participant graduated from college with a 3.3 
GPA and was commissioned in 2005, and our modal participant graduated from the US 
Naval Academy (USNA) with a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering & Math) 
major. Further, nearly half of participants had prior enlisted service, and a variety of 
designators at commissioning are evident. Interestingly, whereas most participants 
transferred laterally into the IWC from other warfare communities (esp. Aviation, 
Submarine, Surface Warfare), a third of our participants entered the IWC directly as O1s.  
Additionally, most participants were not married when commissioned, are 
married with dependent children currently, and are working currently on graduate 
degrees. Participants are divided about evenly between O3 and O4 in terms of current 
rank, and although all five IWC areas are represented, the most common designator is 
1810 – Cryptologic Warfare. Finally, you can see from the table that the most common 
NPS curriculum is Cyber Systems Operations, and four of our nine participants indicate 
that they are likely to leave the Service when the next opportunity arises. 
 
B. FIRST ORDER ANALYSIS 
In this section we summarize the key first order codes and interpretations applied 
to our interview data. We begin by elaborating further on the coding and analytic process. 
Then we summarize data and interpretations for the IWC as a conglomerate, followed by 
summary and examination of its constituent parts.  
1. Coding and Analytic Process Elaboration 
As explained above, first order in vivo codes correspond to terms that are used 
directly by and that are meaningful to organization participants. They reflect Investigator 
interpretations, and they highlight problems, issues, expectations, goals and like 
considerations that seem important in terms of illuminating the nature of IWC talent and 
participants’ thoughts regarding whether to leave or stay in the Navy. They are important 
in their own right, grounding our interpretations in the data, but they also provide fodder 
for our direct interpretation and second order analysis. 
As explained above also, we receive participants’ background questionnaires and 
answers to common questions in advance of the interviews. This streamlines the 
interview process and provides a good basis for asking deeper and individualized 
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questions through probing and homing in on different topics across the various 
participants. We read through each participant’s inputs, highlighting all of the terms and 
statements that appear to have bearing on our research questions. Then we read through 
all participants’ highlighted inputs, looking for common elements in addition to extreme 
responses. Common elements help to establish a basis of cross sample expectations, goals 
and like considerations, whereas extreme responses can signal problems, issues and like 
concerns that may underlie a potential talent retention risk. Of course, anything related to 
talent is highlighted, but we pay attention in particular to the associated stories, terms, 
actions and characteristics. 
As explained above further, we take notes during the interviews, which we 
formalize immediately afterward. These notes represent our focused conversations with 
participants—predicated upon the background information and common questions—
through which we concentrate on topics associated with such first level codes. Our 
interview transcripts are then read, coded and analyzed similarly, and the corresponding 
codes are integrated in with those deriving from the documents. 
As an editorial note, the following discussion incorporates many quotations from 
study participants, which provide important depth, grounding and detail to the analysis. It 
is important to recall that we chose not to record the interviews, hence all such quotations 
are included here as they appear on our interview notes, many of which reflect fast, 
abbreviated writing, liberal use of acronyms, and incomplete sentences that can convey a 
sense of poor grammar and sentence construction. Nonetheless, our study participants are 
articulate, well-spoken, military officers: Any appearance of poor English is attributable 
solely to us and our use of hand written notes. 
2. IWC as A Conglomerate 
Here we summarize data and findings for the IWC as a conglomerate; that is, we 
look across all five designators, beginning with a summary of the key codes from 
interviews in Table 3. Notice that we include inputs for each participant in the table. This 
facilitates the task when we wish to refer back to a specific participant’s interview 
transcript in order to gain more context regarding a certain term, something we do 
extensively in second order analysis. 
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Note that this table excludes codes and frequencies derived from the written 
documents (i.e., background questionnaire and common interview questions). Instead, it 
includes only codes applied through interviews. In essence, a layer of filtering and focus 
has taken place already, as our analysis of written responses has primed us for asking 
more specific and informative questions during the interviews and for placing 
participants’ oral stories and responses in context with their backgrounds, issues, 
expectations and intentions. This enables us to concentrate on talent and retention, yet we 
remain in the contexts of the conversations and use the terms of our participants. 
 
Table 3. Key Codes from Interviews 
 
 
At this point, we’re trying to get an overall sense of the data, looking simply for 
codes that get repeated. The data summarized in the table reflect frequency counts 
associated with a variety of first order codes applied to the interview transcripts, 
presented in descending order of frequency. For instance, the code talent is recorded 11 
Code P1601 P1602 P1603 P1604 P1605 P1606 P1607 P1608 P1609 Total
talent 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 11
technical 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 9
cyber 1 2 1 1 3 8
unfair 2 2 2 1 7
fun 1 1 1 1 3 7
promotion 1 2 1 1 1 6
enjoy 1 1 1 1 2 6
no guidance 1 1 1 1 1 5
people skill 1 1 1 1 1 5
learning 1 1 2 1 5
industry 2 1 1 1 5
transfer 1 2 1 1 5
senior officer 2 1 1 1 5
opportunity 1 1 2 4
experience 1 1 1 1 4
command 2 2 4
challenge 1 1 1 1 4
quality of life 1 2 1 4
communication 1 1 1 1 4
solve problems 1 1 2 4
family 1 1 2 4
personality 2 1 3
milestone tour 1 1 1 3
school 1 1 1 3
busy 2 1 3
money 1 1 1 3
fit 1 2 3
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times across all of the interviews, with technical appearing nine times, cyber appearing 
eight times, and so forth. The full table, containing roughly 85 codes overall, is 
considerably longer than the truncated one summarized here. Here we include only those 
with codes applied three times or more. 
Of course, since we are present for the interviews, asking questions and taking 
notes, we have much more than just the code frequencies: We have the transcripts and 
contexts of the conversations within which the codes are applied. For instance, the code 
technical is applied frequently in the same context as talent, for many participants appear 
to associate IWC talent with technical proficiency. Likewise, people skill and 
communication are both applied frequently in this same talent context also. Already 
we’re developing an idea of what IWC officers see in terms of talent: Technical 
proficiency, people skill and communication (ability). Interestingly, personality, although 
largely an innate characteristic, is associated with talent by several participants also. 
As another instance, we apply codes such as unfair, promotion, no guidance, 
industry, opportunity, command, quality of life and milestone tour frequently in the same 
context as being disappointed, feeling disenfranchised, and leaning toward leaving the 
Navy as opposed to staying in. These codes help to illuminate dissatisfiers, particularly 
when placed in context of the associated conversations, and they begin to point us toward 
aspects of Navy life and work that may merit attention.  
Alternatively, other codes such as enjoy, cyber, learning, fun and experience are 
applied instead with aspects of Navy life and work that help to attract, interest and retain 
our participants, inducing them to lean more toward staying in the Navy than leaving it. 
These codes help to illuminate motivators, particularly when placed in context of the 
associated conversations, and they begin to point us toward aspects of Navy life and work 
that may merit broader replication. 
Finally, senior officer is a code that is applied in two contrasting contexts. On one 
side, some participants refer to experiences with senior officers as highly enjoyable, 
educational and motivational. This is the case in particular where some kind of special 
relationship (e.g., working as an aide, having a mentor, being taught) emerges and 
corresponds generally with people who are leaning more toward staying in the Navy than 
leaving it. On the other side, however, some senior officers are perceived as unfair, aloof, 
 24 
demonstrating overt favoritism, and evaluating people based on personality factors more 
than talent. This is the case in particular with participants who describe themselves as 
“quiet” yet “competent” and who are leaning more toward leaving the Navy than staying 
in. 
Some additional codes, although appearing with less frequency than those 
summarized in the table, seem potentially very important also, particularly in the context 
of IWC talent and retention. Hence we pay attention to them as well.  
3. IWC Constituencies 
Beginning with a summary of the key codes from our interviews in Table 4, here 
we divide the IWC into two constituent parts or tribes, which we label “Cyber Warrior” 
and “Information Communicator.” Note, these labels represent our interpretation, 
division and naming—not that of the study participants, IWC or Navy as a whole—based 
on coherence that we infer from the qualitative data. For instance, based on the interviews 
and our interpretation of the corresponding transcripts, we note a relatively coherent 
message, style and attitude from the 1810 (Cryptologic Warfare) and 1840 (Cyber 
Warfare Engineer) participants, which seem to differ qualitatively from that of their 1800 
(Oceanography) and 1830 (Intelligence) counterparts.  
The 1820 (Information Professional) participants, however, reflect many 
attributes and characteristics of both tribes, and although they do not fit neatly into either 
constituency, we view them as cohering more closely with the latter than the former. 
Thus, it is apparent that our division of the IWC into these two constituencies is rough 
and approximate, not exact and precise, yet we accept such roughness and imprecision 
for the insights enabled in this qualitative analysis. We leave any development of exact 
and precise groupings to future research. 
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Table 4. IWC Codes By Constituency 
 
 
As a differentiating example, the term cyber appears to be viewed inconsistently 
across the two tribes. For the first (i.e., 1810 & 1840), references to cyber and computer 
networks resembles that of a weapon. For instance, P1601 (Cyber Warfare Engineer) 
discusses an assignment in “the offensive operations arm of [Agency] … an organization 
that focused on high risk operations … projects that were deemed to be critical by the 
President and intelligence … postured to conduct computer network attacks when 
ordered.” P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) has a similar story: “I was assigned to [Agency] 
[Program] Operations where I served as a [leadership role] and ultimately [greater 
leadership role] for the Counterterrorism and [Country] mission sets. … Had direct 
impact daily.” 
Further, P1609 (Intelligence) expresses an interest in making a career pivot into 
cyber, moving out of intelligence, and hoping to work in the CNODP (computer network 
operations development program). This officer discusses an inherently better fit with the 
Cyber Warrior side, noting a “crypto and computer interest since childhood; born with 
video games; first computer at age 6.” Although appreciative of the communicator role 
played through Intelligence, this officer sees a better job and career fit with cyber. 
Information Warrior Information Communicator
Code P1602 P1604 P1605 P1608 P1601 Subtotal P1606 P1607 P1609 P1603 Subtotal Delta
1810 1810 1810 1810 1840 1820 1820 1830 1800
talent 2 2 1 5 1 2 2 1 6 1
technical 2 1 1 1 5 1 1 2 4 -1
cyber 2 1 1 4 1 3 4 0
unfair 1 1 2 2 2 6 5
fun 1 1 1 3 1 3 4 1
promotion 1 1 2 1 1 2 4 2
enjoy 1 2 3 1 1 1 3 0
no guidance 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 -3
people skill 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1
learning 1 1 2 2 1 3 1
industry 1 1 2 1 1 4 3
transfer 2 1 3 1 1 2 -1
senior officer 1 1 2 1 2 3 1
opportunity 1 1 2 4 0 -4
experience 1 1 1 3 1 1 -2
command 2 2 4 0 -4
challenge 1 1 1 1 1 3 2
quality of life 1 2 3 1 1 -2
communication 1 1 1 1 1 3 2
solve problems 1 1 2 1 3 2
family 1 1 1 2 3 2
personality 1 1 2 2 1
milestone tour 1 1 1 1 2 1
school 1 1 1 1 2 1
busy 2 2 1 1 -1
money 1 1 2 1 1 -1
fit 0 1 2 3 3
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Nonetheless, the officer views intelligence as a vital, communication focused activity: A 
key aspect of talent involves one’s ability to “communicate important information.” 
Even participants on the Cyber Warrior side express respect for and appreciation 
of the Communicator role. P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) says that Oceanography officers 
onboard ship can complete (for rankings) effectively: “Officers are ranked across all IWC 
designators; METOCs, IPs, cryptos, intels all compete for CAPT/ADM rankings.” When 
asked if some designators, like METOC for instance, are handicapped, this participant 
said, “No. Weather is important to CSGs [carrier strike groups].” 
Others on the Information Communicator side emphasize the communication role 
also, yet they express frustration regarding resources being allocated to the Cyber 
Warrior side. P1606 (Information Professional), for instance, notes a “lack of emphasis 
on space billets” and claims that the IWC “views space as a collateral interest.” P1603 
(Oceanography) describes the METOC community’s communicator role similarly. 
P1608 (Information Professional) is even more emphatic: “Many leaders in the IP 
community seem as though they are either too focused on the new buzzwords of ‘Cyber’ 
… than they are on what actually makes the Navy run: Communications, both terrestrial 
and satellite. They don’t seem to understand just how tedious, time consuming and 
difficult these actually are. The loss of an entire island’s communications node is 
overlooked while a lost laptop is pored over.” Likewise, “[Leader] cares more about the 
smallest cyber (non) issue than … about the largest, most damaging communications 
issue.”  
As accomplished for the IWC as a conglomerate above, in Table 4 we also tally 
code frequencies, but here we do so separately for the two constituencies. The respective 
subtotals are interesting separately, but we include a “Delta” column to highlight how 
some codes are applied more frequently for one tribe or another. For instance, the code 
unfair appears six times more often in the communication group than in its cyber 
counterpart, and coded comparisons with industry appear four times more often. 
Alternatively command is a code applied in the context of opportunity four times more 
often in the cyber group. Indeed, we do not see this code applied at all in such context to 
the communication group. These coding disparities appear to stem from tribal 
differences. We build further upon this interpretation in the section below. 
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C. SECOND ORDER ANALYSIS 
In this section we summarize the second order analysis of our qualitative data. In 
the secondary stage, we treat first order codes and interpretations as “data” for second 
order analysis. This second order analysis augments its first order counterpart with 
theoretical insight and comparison, bringing in the investigator’s perspective that is 
informed by the literature. We begin with second order code induction. Then we draw 
more deeply from the interview transcripts to flesh out each second order code further. 
1. Second Order Code Induction 
We begin by examining the codes from above. Iterating back and forth between 
each code and its context within the interview transcripts, we induce four second level 
codes (i.e., codes that summarize in vivo codes) and use them to help organize and cluster 
the first order codes: 1) talent, 2) motivator, 3) dissatisfier and 4) tribal. Regarding the 
first, given its central place in this study, we simply elevate talent to a second level code, 
and building upon first order codes, we induce motivator, dissatisfier and tribal as 
additional second level codes to help organize and cluster the data. Each of these second 
level codes is associated with all of their first order counterparts that apply, and the 
summary above is extended as such in Table 5.  
Beginning with the talent code, for this technique, we simply mark an “x” in the 
“Talent” column for all first order codes that are associated in the contexts of our 
interview conversations. Within the first order codes shown here, we find nine associated 
with talent: talent, technical, cyber, people skill, senior officer, experience, 
communication, personality, and fit. Extending the list to the remaining codes not shown 
in this table, we also include specialist, smart, performance, IT, get things done, leaving, 
knowledge, trust, results, respect, meritocracy, and competence. Again, in the IWC 




Table 5. Code Associations 
 
 
Likewise for motivators, in the table we find cyber, fun, enjoy, learning, senior 
officer, opportunity, command, challenge, solve problems, and busy. Extending the list to 
codes not shown in this table, we also include service, sailors, pride, ops, impact, career, 
boss, adventure, pay, passion, interesting, independence, friendship, benefits, autonomy, 
rewarding, responsibility, pension, offensive, important, drive, clearance, and 
advancement. Notice that some of the same first order codes appear in multiple second 
order columns; that is, a single first order code can associate with more than one second 
order, depending upon the context.  
Further for dissatisfiers, in the table we find unfair, promotion, no guidance, 
industry, transfer, senior officer, command, quality of life, family, personality, milestone 
tour, school, busy, and money. Extending the list to codes not shown in this table, we also 
include standards, specialist, OJT, NIOC, generalist, dissatisfaction, career, boss, billets, 
top down, status, retention, leaving, women, turnover, tribes, top heavy, seniority, 
resources, ranking, priority, leader, introvert, fitrep, exposure, cliques, breadth, and 
advancement.  
Finally for tribal, in the table we find unfair, industry, opportunity, and command. 
These stem from the differences noted above when comparing the Cyber Warrior and 
Code P1601 P1602 P1603 P1604 P1605 P1606 P1607 P1608 P1609 Total Talent Motivator Dissatisfier Tribal
talent 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 11 x
technical 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 9 x
cyber 1 2 1 1 3 8 x x
unfair 2 2 2 1 7 x x
fun 1 1 1 1 3 7 x
promotion 1 2 1 1 1 6 x
enjoy 1 1 1 1 2 6 x
no guidance 1 1 1 1 1 5 x
people skill 1 1 1 1 1 5 x
learning 1 1 2 1 5 x
industry 2 1 1 1 5 x x
transfer 1 2 1 1 5 x
senior officer 2 1 1 1 5 x x x
opportunity 1 1 2 4 x x
experience 1 1 1 1 4 x
command 2 2 4 x x x
challenge 1 1 1 1 4 x
quality of life 1 2 1 4 x
communication 1 1 1 1 4 x
solve problems 1 1 2 4 x
family 1 1 2 4 x
personality 2 1 3 x x
milestone tour 1 1 1 3 x
school 1 1 1 3 x
busy 2 1 3 x x
money 1 1 1 3 x
fit 1 2 3 x
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Information Communicator tribes, and the constituent first order codes reflect differing 
emphasis across the tribes. In our analysis below, we also induce the tribal code 
community image, which we discuss there. Notice that three of the four first order tribal 
codes associate with dissatisfier. This suggests that differences across tribes may 
represent a source of dissatisfaction, a suggestion that we pursue further below.  
 
Table 6. Second Order Codes and Associated First Orders 
Second Order Associated First Orders 
Talent talent, technical, cyber, people skill, senior officer, experience, 
communication, personality, fit, specialist, smart, performance, IT, get 
things done, leaving, knowledge, trust, results, respect, meritocracy, 
competence 
Motivators cyber, fun, enjoy, learning, senior officer, opportunity, command, 
challenge, solve problems, busy, service, sailors, pride, ops, impact, 
career, boss, adventure, pay, passion, interesting, independence, 
friendship, benefits, autonomy, rewarding, responsibility, pension, 
offensive, important, drive, clearance, advancement 
Dissatisfiers unfair, promotion, no guidance, industry, transfer, senior officer, 
command, quality of life, family, personality, milestone tour, school, 
busy, money, standards, specialist, OJT, NIOC, generalist, 
dissatisfaction, career, boss, billets, top down, status, retention, 
leaving, women, turnover, tribes, top heavy, seniority, resources, 
ranking, priority, leader, introvert, fitrep, exposure, cliques, breadth, 
advancement 
Tribal unfair, industry, opportunity, command, community image 
 
This kind of analysis continues for additional codes that appear useful, interesting 
and informative, but instead of analyzing them all at once in a large batch process (e.g., 
developing all possible second order codes), we begin with these first four, continue with 
second order analysis, and then iterate back through the data, first order analysis and even 
follow-up interviews as necessary. We summarize the four second order codes and all 
associated first order codes (including community image) in Table 6. Although counts 
and frequencies are not central to qualitative analysis, we note that the number of terms 
used for the four second order codes talent, motivators, dissatisfiers and tribal, 
respectively, is 21, 33, 42 and 5. Although we certainly do not perceive our participants 
as a whiny group, they do mention several more dissatisfiers than motivators during the 
interviews. Their willingness to share dissatisfying as well as motivating stories and 
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experiences gives us confidence that participants value the anonymity of our study, which 
increases the credibility of their responses. 
We continue by examining this table more closely, and although we apply our 
theoretical insight and comparison, the analysis remains grounded firmly in data. For ease 
of organization, we address each of the four second order codes from above in turn.  
2. Talent 
Starting with talent, we see 21 codes applied in the context of describing people 
with “talent,” observations of “talent,” and impressions of “talent.” Additional context 
helps to flesh out the ideas. For instance, nearly every participant uses the term technical 
when discussing IWC talent.  
When discussing offensive cyber operations, for instance, P1602 (Cryptologic 
Warfare) notes, “[there are] not many technically competent people in E7-9 ranks. [The] 
best people [are] working 70+ hours/week. Many do not (want to) promote to chief or are 
not interested in doing all of the non-work activities required. … Technical capability 
peaks at E6: This is the last rank where sailors advance based on ratings exam knowledge 
and where there is less emphasis on extracurricular/collateral duty jobs.” In this domain, 
at least for the enlisted personnel, talent does not appear to correlate with rank; indeed, 
the opposite seems more apparent. 
This participant goes on to characterize the most talented person in the group: 
“Cyber ops organizations are meritocracies [e.g., his team lead was E5]. … [Name] was 
the smartest guy in the room … best technical background, coded in high school, tinkered 
in the basement. … In the military, most of these people are enlisted: operators on the 
keyboard.” He continues by saying that it is, “very hard to retain them. [Name] left for a 
contractor job at $150k salary and free education. … He went from E5/E6 and is now VP 
at [Company Name].” Here we see how talent in this context correlates with being a 
specialist at cyber operations, being smart, able to get things done, especially as 
“operators on the keyboard.”  
We learn also that meritocracy pertains to this environment, another indication 
that rank and talent are not tightly associated, and when probing to learn how this highly 
talented person acquired his ability, we learn that knowledge was developed long before 
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joining the military: “best technical background, coded in high school, tinkered in the 
basement.”  
When asked more directly about talent, this participant adds that a talented officer 
is “smart; knows how to handle things; a high performer, early promote.” Here we see the 
term smart used again, and we see performance arise in the context of talent. When 
probed on what was meant by “smart,” this participant includes some characteristics: 
“GPA irrelevant; underlying intelligence; able to sift through many rules, regs and 
constraints; make IT work; get things done; think past SOPs (understand principles); push 
beyond training (creative).” Again, we see terms repeated (e.g., get things done), and we 
see IT [information technology] used to describe the specific class of technology that is 
key to talent in the IWC. 
P1603 (Oceanography) echoes some of these same associations regarding talent, 
saying that it corresponds with being “knowledgeable and good at what they do,” 
repeating the knowledge connection but also bringing competence and results into view. 
Further, here we get the idea that “personality and mentoring” are associated with talent. 
Looking to the interview transcripts for additional context, we see that personality is 
associated with fit: “I’m kind of a quiet guy,” he says, adding, “most senior officers look 
for JOs who are self-promoting,” and then complaining, “talent doesn’t get recognized 
and rewarded.” We discuss this association between talent, recognition and reward in the 
dissatisfiers section below, but the implication is that people with talent are not 
necessarily the ones who garner rewards for it. 
When asked to describe a “talented person,” this participant replies, “respect him 
as an officer; respect him as a person; not a careerist; just generally good at it.” Here we 
see the term respect (both professional and personal) used in connection with talent, in 
addition to another association with competence, saying this talented officer is “just 
generally good at it.”  
P1604 (Cryptologic Warfare) offers a similar association between talent and 
technology, but adds two other components to the set: “Talent = technical competence + 
political sciences (world knowledge) + people skills.” Here we see people skill arise 
again, which this participant implies is important even for the stereotypic introvert that 
many people associate commonly with people who are technically competent with IT: 
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“Some people fill all buckets. Even some introverts know how to manage people.” In 
identifying how talent is acquired, he says: “Components of talent can be taught and 
learned.” The interview moves then into a story about a very talented CoS [Chief of 
Staff] who exemplifies this view of talent. 
P1608 (Cryptologic Warfare) emphasizes communication also as a key 
component of talent, saying that “communication skills, working knowledge of job, and 
explaining technical stuff to senior officers” all contribute. P1609 (Intelligence) agrees 
with respect to the intelligence community, saying that talent involves being able to 
“communicate important information” in addition to “eloquence.” However, we learn that 
talent along these lines can be misappropriated, saying that often, “the story is irrelevant. 
… A great speaker … uses a salesman’s tactics to sell [an] idea even though the analysis 
may be flawed.” 
Other participants reinforce the importance of technical competence. P1605 
(Cryptologic Warfare) offers, for instance, that a particularly “talented officer” has a 
“technical skill set [and] lots of experience,” continuing, “computer, geeky, techie skill 
set.” Describing further what talent looks like in a war zone, we learn that in 
“Afghanistan, talent equals technical competence.” Interestingly, this participant admits 
to not possessing this same kind of technical talent yet remains highly motivated and 
optimistic, noting, “I have people skills … [Nick name] is the party planner.” 
P1606 (Information Professional) equates talent with “technical leadership.” A 
talented officer “knows the details but can rise above them.” He goes on to tell a story 
about a junior officer who exhibited considerable talent and leveraged the meritocratic 
nature of the organization. When a particularly troubling, technical problem affected the 
organization, everyone from the CO to deckplate technicians was involved with trying to 
solve it: “The JO told everyone to stop troubleshooting and to draw it on the white board 
instead.” Apparently people listened to this junior officer, despite lower rank, and the 
problem was solved.  
 P1607 (Information Professional) describes a “very talented” friend and colleague 
who is leaving the Navy. This person has “the clearances, credentials and experiences to 
make him very valuable in industry.” He goes on to confirm the importance of technical 
competence in terms of talent, but adds several other characteristics, including, “drive: 
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you want to be the best; set the new high bar … try to remain on par with civilians, but 
can never keep up; problem with generalization vs. specialization.” This notion of 
specialization arises repeatedly through the interviews, particularly as a dissatisfier, for 
naval officers are rotated systematically through different jobs in order to promote 
breadth, but technical competence—a key component of IWC talent—appears to demand 
specialization.  
P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) agrees: “Trust is critical in this domain. 
Organizations have very short memories and extremely high turnover. You must stay 
current to remain good. These are very perishable skills, especially in an operational 
environment. One year away and you’re worthless!” Here too we find trust arising as a 
component of talent, particularly trust in one’s technical competence and ability to get 
things done. 
To round out our discussion on talent, P1609 (Intelligence) is one who is making 
a career pivot, studying Cyber Systems Operations and hoping to get a cyber job after 
completing degree work at the NPS. As such, and in contrast with the importance of 
communication in terms of talent in the intelligence domain, when describing “talented 
people” in the cyber domain, we see a number of characteristics: “creativity; open 
minded; long multicolor hair and tattoos; countercultural; innovative; think outside box; 
challenge dogmatic ideas; explore fringe ideas; software developers; develop tools; go 
beyond training; stumble across successes; logical analysis; defeating others’ systems; 
interdisciplinary.” Note that this same participant characterizes talent in the intelligence 
domain differently than in the cyber domain. This gives much credence to the idea that 
talent likely differs even across IWC areas and is likely to be highly situated (e.g., 
dependent upon one’s job assignment) and nuanced (e.g., sometimes favoring technical 
competence and achieving results, other times favoring communication and people 
skills). 
To summarize, IWC talent appears to have a strong rooting in (IT) technical 
competence. However, it does not appear to correlate with rank—at least from the 
perspective of these (O3 & O4) participants. Indeed, beyond a certain point, there appears 
to be an inverse correlation between rank and what our IWC participants view as talent. 
Technical competence is a central root of IWC talent that renders many operational 
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organizations into meritocracies, where the person best able to solve problems is 
encouraged and permitted to lead. Interestingly, our Strategic Contact likens this to SEAL 
and other special forces teams.  
This technical competence root of talent appears further to require considerable 
specialization, in addition to intelligence and experience, in order to get things done. 
Knowledge—much of it acquired before military service, but the rest learned principally 
on the job—is central to technical competence. This applies particularly as knowledge 
pertains to IT, but working effectively within a situated organization and environment 
appears to be important too, as talented people are able to sift through rules and 
constraints, think past SOPs, push beyond training, and be creative, all the while fitting 
in. Additionally, talent appears to involve people skills and communication also, with the 
ability to lead technical workers important in many officer contexts. This requires trust, 
and it appears that the most talented people in the IWC may not be the same ones who 
(are motivated to) emerge as IWC leaders. 
3. Motivators 
Continuing with motivators, we see 33 codes applied in the context of describing 
people who are “motivated,” observations of “motivation,” and impressions of likely 
“retention.” Additional context helps to flesh out the ideas. For instance, nearly every 
participant uses the term enjoy or fun as an IWC motivator.  
When discussing what motivates talented people to stay in the Navy, for instance, 
P1606 (Information Professional) says that he and others “enjoy the work.” This 
participant includes a number of other motivators: “people you work with; shared 
suffering; strong bond and friendships (awesome); lead great sailors; see and help them 
improve; honor to serve and lead them; pay and benefits are good.” Here we see 
friendship, leadership of sailors, and service mentioned.  
Notice that we see pay and benefits included as motivators too. P1603 
(Oceanography) offers a similar comment regarding “pension and guaranteed income.” 
This strikes something of a contrast with some of the comments from above regarding 
talent. In that previous (cyber) context, military pay is viewed as inadequate to retain the 
most talented people, but here (with an Information Professional) we find pay as a 
motivator. This may suggest additional differences and nuances between IWC tribes, 
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through which retention measures may necessarily have to differ from one designator or 
tribe to another. 
P1605 is especially enthusiastic: “Everything pulls me with regards to staying in 
the Navy!  The people, the camaraderie, the pay, the benefits, flexible schedule, time off, 
discipline, the environment, the change of duty stations every two to three years. …  
Additionally, I don’t know what job in the civilian world would give the pay, benefits 
and flexibility that I have in the Navy.  I don’t think there’s a job out there that I would 
enjoy as much as I do with the Navy.” Nonetheless, this unmarried participant notes a 
relationship cost: “The only thing that would really pull me away from the Navy is the 
lack of a steady relationship. With being in a highly mobile career and a strong 
independent type A [gender], I find it rather hard to meet [opposite gender] of the same 
caliber that would want to commit in a relationship given my ever changing and moving 
job.”  
P1608 (Cryptologic Warfare) mentions enjoyment also. Here it is more in the 
context of opportunity, and this prior enlisted participant appreciates in particular 
opportunity in terms of education and living abroad. In contrast, this same participant 
describes having to relocate frequently as a quality of life issue, so it’s unclear whether 
travel is a net positive or negative. P1609 (Intelligence) mentions enjoyment as a 
motivator also, noting in particular “freedom to explore and do what they enjoy.” The 
context of this statement suggests that independence and autonomy are important 
contributors to enjoyment. 
P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) discusses enjoyment as well: “I enjoy the challenge 
and the ability to have an impact, whether at the tactical or strategic level in the defense 
of the nation.” Here we find challenge as a motivator, especially where this participant 
could have impact, and P1601 (Cyber Warfare Engineer) notes how in the cyber domain 
it is “fun to conduct ops,” particularly in offensive cyber ops. Interestingly, both P1601 
and P1602 exhibit considerable pride when discussing their cyber jobs, characterizing 
them more in terms of adventure than work, and P1606 (Information Professional) even 
mentions passion with work: “space is a passionate pursuit.” This participant adds 
quickly some disappointment, however, that “space does not receive priority.” It seems 
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that the motivational effect of job enjoyment can be countered by the inability of talented 
people to pursue their passions. 
Other, similar motivators emerge from the interviews. P1605 (Cryptologic 
Warfare) notes how at every duty station, this participant will “take on new challenges, 
risks, and learn something new. There’s nothing at this moment that I necessarily dislike 
about my work.” It seems clear that learning is important, and this person appears to be 
satisfied with the job. P1603 (Oceanography) discusses how interesting work is an 
important motivator and how it appears to contrast with advancement: “leaders [are] not 
doing interesting work; not focusing on important work.” P1608 (Cryptologic Warfare) 
adds that the “technical aspect of the job is interesting,” and P1609 (Intelligence) follows 
suit, saying how a “Cyber job would be exciting … especially CNODP [computer 
network operations development program would be] very interesting! I want to steer 
toward that job!” 
Related perhaps to enjoyment and fun, we also find participants discussing 
motivators in terms of rewarding work. For instance, P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) 
describes his cyber operations assignment with [Agency] as the “most rewarding tour of 
my career!” Continuing with enthusiasm, this participant was also “very busy; always on 
call.” Despite being busy, this participant enjoyed considerable responsibility and did not 
seem to mind the long hours and frequent trips at night and on weekends into the 
classified spaces. 
Related perhaps also to enjoyment and fun, we find the ability to solve problems. 
P1603 (Oceanography), for instance, notes regarding motivating factors how this 
participant enjoys the opportunity to “solve problems in the organization.” This officer 
provides additional insight regarding retention: “staying in is easy; getting out and 
transitioning is hard.” Apparently, overcoming career switching costs represents a 
(probably inadvertent) motivator that helps to retain talent. 
P1604 (Cryptologic Warfare) echoes the problem solving motivator: “I like 
building a team to solve a problem.  I’ve been lucky in being placed in positions, and 
having the support of great bosses, where I’ve been able to build my team and solve 
major problems or fill key intelligence gaps.” Here we see how one’s boss, a more senior 
officer, can also exert a motivational effect on job enjoyment and talent retention. P1605 
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(Cryptologic Warfare) goes further to note how some senior officers have provided very 
strong motivation via “Mentorship – positive influence from some senior officers.” 
Finally, career and advancement are on the minds of most participants. P1606 
(Information Professional) notes: “I’ll do everything I can to be the next CNO; 100% 
dedicated to my career.” P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) adds: “Unless something 
significant occurs, I will make the Navy a career (at least until 21 years); after that I will 
need to re-evaluate the work, my potential career path (which is somewhat unclear) and 
family considerations.” Most participants mention an interest in command, and they 
exhibit considerable drive. As we note in the next subsection, however, such drive toward 
command represents a metaphoric two-edge sword: On the one edge, it is highly 
motivational, but on the other, lack of command opportunities represents a source of 
frustration and dissatisfaction in the IWC. 
To summarize, enjoyment of one’s work, having fun on the job, making 
friendships, leading and mentoring sailors, serving one’s country and shipmates, and 
being passionate about what one does: These all serve as motivators that help to retain 
talent. Independence and autonomy are positive motivators also, as are challenge and the 
ability to have impact. Likewise, learning is important to most participants, as is problem 
solving, and having interesting and rewarding work is viewed quite favorably, even when 
people remain very busy and work very hard.  
Further, we find that pay and benefits serve as motivators for some, but others 
complain that the civilian sector offers much better pay and benefits. This may reflect 
some differences between IWC tribes. Likewise some participants note the adventure, 
changing jobs and locations, and learning something new every few years as 
motivational—particularly where more-senior officers provide mentorship and positive 
leadership—whereas others complain about job rotation frustrating their ability to 
specialize and pursue their passions, in addition to the disruption of family life by having 
to deploy and move frequently. Although the career switching costs appear to represent a 
(probably inadvertent) motivator that helps to retain talent, several participants complain 
about not being able to pursue their passions, about not being able to specialize and 
continue in jobs that they enjoy, and about quality of life issues that reduce motivation. 
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Additionally, more-senior officers—through their impact on both enjoyment and 
command opportunities—appear to play a major role in terms of motivation (and 
dissatisfaction). Mentorship and making a work environment enjoyable and rewarding 
exert a very positive motivational influence. Alternatively, bosses who exhibit favoritism, 
who create a toxic work environment, and who limit opportunities for good experiences 
that enhance one’s chances of attaining command one day represent a major source of 
dissatisfaction, which we describe next. 
4. Dissatisfiers 
Continuing with dissatisfiers, we see 42 codes applied in the context of describing 
people who are “dissatisfied,” observations of “disappointment,” and impressions of 
unlikely “retention.” Additional context helps to flesh out the ideas. Even more so than 
with the second order codes above, dissatisfiers appear to apply inconsistently across the 
IWC. Indeed, sources of dissatisfaction—and the corresponding likelihood of leaving the 
Navy—differ across tribes.  
To summarize at a high level, although those in the Cyber Warrior Tribe appear 
generally to enjoy what they do, many express dissatisfaction with having to leave fun 
jobs and serve in other roles. Alternatively, although many in the Information 
Communicator Tribe also express dissatisfaction with the need to rotate out of jobs that 
they are passionate about, a major source of frustration stems from what they view as an 
unfair bias against them. Quality of life issues emerge of course, and many participants 
compare their military jobs, careers and lives with counterparts in the civilian world. We 
begin with the cyber warriors and then discuss their information communicator 
counterparts. 
As noted above, many cyber warriors appear to find particular reward, satisfaction 
and enjoyment in their work. As noted above also, however, the allure of civilian jobs is 
powerful, particularly where talented people can have opportunities to continue in cyber 
and like jobs that they enjoy. Hence having to rotate out of fun jobs represents a major 
source of dissatisfaction and a high retention risk. P1601 (Cyber Warfare Engineer), for 
instance, indicates a high likelihood of leaving the Service because of dissatisfiers. For 
one, this participant’s next tour will not involve cyber operations, but for another, this 
talented officer complains about bureaucracy and people who are afraid to make 
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important decisions: “I am tired of the situations that I explained [above]. I know they 
exist in the civilian world, but I will be paid better there [in the civilian sector].”  
P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) agrees, adding that rotation is a big problem: 
“people can’t stay and do a job they enjoy forever. … They’re expected to move around, 
gain breadth. … The smartest cyber operator we had was sent to a DDG. … These people 
can earn nine times the money outside in industry: banks, security firms, government 
contractors, SCADA control, etc. … [It’s problematic to] transfer people out of fun jobs. 
… There’s huge demand for their skills.”  
P1608 (Cryptologic Warfare) piles on, noting, “big civilian needs [for people 
with] IT experience and acquisition experience,” adding that “banking is calling for 
cybers,” and explaining how, “sea tours are all staff jobs, lots of work, staying late, low 
quality of life.” P1601 (Cyber Warfare Engineer) adds that “people want to be attached to 
operational (cyber) units.” P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare) agrees, saying that “people like 
cyber.” 
Further, because of high classification levels and highly compartmentalized 
information, the people who were responsible for P1601 (Cyber Warfare Engineer) 
administratively were not the same ones he was responsible to operationally. This created 
tension, for the people he worked for operationally found it difficult to reward good 
performance, and those who could reward such performance were unable to learn about 
it. 
Although not limited to this IWC tribe, participants also complain about lack of 
opportunity for promotion, advancement and command. P1602 (Cryptologic Warfare), 
for instance, emphasizes problems with milestone tours: “O4 milestone tour can be 
problematic. 280 O4s competing for only 60 milestone tour billets. 1810 milestones differ 
from those needed by 1820s. Selections are made based on performance and/or 
experience; ideally you want both, but sometimes one is more compelling.” Given the 
importance of milestone tours in the IWC, this appears to be a structural retention filter, 
but it is unclear whether it represents a deliberate or unintentional one. 
P1604 (Cryptologic Warfare) agrees but focuses attention more on limited 
opportunities for command: “The Navy needs to take a bottom up and top down view of 
manpower. DDG & LCS are both command jobs, but one involves many more people 
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than the other. 1810 magnet sites (NIOCs) are run by O6s and have 1000 – 2000 people; 
[the IWC] should be able to break them up and offer more command opportunities.” This 
and other participants note how many of their SWO (Surface Warfare Officer) 
counterparts will have command jobs at O5. Having the rank “Commander” without an 
opportunity for command seems frustrating to them.  
P1608 (Cryptologic Warfare) makes the same point: “Now that I have been in for 
a while I noticed that there is not really that much room for growth in my community.  
What I mean by ‘growth’ is not much opportunity for command.  My goal since I was 
commissioned has always been to command, and looking at the numbers, the odds are 
stacked against everyone.” This officer adds, moreover: “Command opportunities are 
decreasing due to base consolidation.” In order for this officer “to stay in … [the IWC 
would have to] increase CO opportunities, break up NIOCs, and increase the number of 
COs.” Further, this participant echoes a sentiment from above: “Working long hours on 
staff tours is not worth the effort,” adding that “SWOs [are] getting XO & CO jobs at O4 
& O5.” Here we see further how participants in the IWC—a great many of whom 
transferred laterally from the SWO and other warfare communities—compare themselves 
with peers in other communities. In this case, the IWC officers appear to feel 
disadvantaged.  
Not everyone agrees, however. P1604 (Cryptologic Warfare) says, for instance: 
“Getting results is more important than promotion.” This officer adds: “The Navy is not 
going to make me a flag officer.” “I’m not good at writing. Can’t keep my mouth shut.” 
Another element of dissatisfaction centers on the career path and expectations 
within the IWC. As with the discussion above of limited opportunity for promotion, 
advancement and command, this element is not limited to the Cyber Warrior Tribe either. 
P1604 (Cryptologic Warfare) adds to the comments above: “18xx has no golden path to 
advancement. Contrast SWO community: 100% command opportunity.” P1605 
(Cryptologic Warfare) agrees, adding: “Career roadmap is missing (e.g., ship tour, NPS, 
etc.); getting fuzzy; lots of growth and change in community; hard to know what to do 
next.” P1608 confirms, saying that “career progression is unstructured and unclear.”  
Finally, we come to quality of life, which is not a new issue with the Navy, nor is 
it limited to either IWC. Some accept the sacrifice, and others do not. Here are some 
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thoughts from those in the Cyber Warrior Tribe. P1608 (Cryptologic Warfare), says, for 
instance: “The opportunity in the civilian world is great for experienced Cryptologic 
Warfare Officers; six-figure salary; M-F day job; no worry about uprooting the family; 
no worry about missing birthdays, holidays, or special occasions; etc.” P1604 
(Cryptologic Warfare) agrees, describing this participant’s previous decision to leave the 
“Nuclear Navy,” “turned down a $250k nuke bonus,” saying it was “not enough to keep 
me in; missed daughter’s first birthday; quality of life is important.” P1609 (Intelligence), 
who is working to pivot toward cyber jobs, echoes this sentiment: “I don’t want to be 
deployed and away from family.” 
Many of these same sentiments are echoed by participants from the Information 
Communicator Tribe, so we do not repeat them here. Rather, we focus on differences 
between dissatisfiers across the two tribes. For one, several report what they perceive to 
be an unfair bias against them. P1606 (Information Professional) says, for instance, “IWs 
[Cryptologic Warfare officers] have high status because of the cyber mission, especially 
those on the offensive side. IPs are largely shut out of cyber.” Hence the inability to work 
in cyber jobs is dissatisfying and seemingly unfair to this participant.  
P1607 (Information Professional) has similar comments: “The IWC is giving 
away ‘our’ billets to cryptos [Cryptologic Warfare officers].” Also, this participant adds: 
“Coms jobs are seen as routine. … This is a negative sum community. … After a certain 
rank, one stops getting challenged; jobs become boring. … I had to fight for my sea 
tour.” There appears to be a perceived status gap between cyber warriors and information 
communicators that is dissatisfying to some in the latter tribe. This officer adds: “Cryptos 
[Cryptologic Warfare officers] are getting all the attention. Cyber gets all the attention. 
… We IPs [Information Professionals] … feel like second class citizens. O6 jobs are 
going to cryptos.” Despite this dissatisfier, the officer adds: “I don’t mind being a support 
member.” As Rodney Dangerfield might have said, “I get no respect” (Dangerfield, 
2016). 
Also, similar to the issue noted above of having to rotate out of enjoyable cyber 
jobs, some information communicators are dissatisfied with having to generalize and gain 
breadth through job assignments. It seems that many would prefer to specialize instead. 
P1603 (Oceanography), for instance, earned a PhD but complains about the unfairness of 
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people without PhDs getting D-coded billets (i.e., jobs specified for PhDs). This officer is 
required to work in jobs that do not leverage the considerable education paid for and 
provided by the Navy, which is dissatisfying. P1606 (Information Professional) 
complains similarly about a lack of opportunities, saying there are “more opportunities 
for some professionals than others,” and arguing that there is “opportunity for better fit as 
an SME [subject matter expert] vs generalist.” As noted above, space is a passion for this 
information professional, but the lack of opportunities to work in space jobs is 
dissatisfying. 
P1609 (Intelligence) is dissatisfied with job opportunities also, but this 
participant’s perception of unfairness focuses on recruiters and detailers. “Recruiting is a 
flawed process. Recruiters redirect people into jobs to be filled instead of making good 
matches.” This participant—a high GPA, technology oriented, math and philosophy 
major in college, with crypto and computer interest since childhood—repeatedly sought 
technology jobs but was offered only intelligence work. As a result, this participant 
“might get out after the payback tour.” “Intel is not what I thought,” he adds. This officer 
explains why many intelligence officers choose to stay in the Navy: “job security; fear of 
the unknown; sustain them financially; gives them meaning through community; small 
community; networking is big; socially motivated; brotherhood; overall people choose to 
stay.” Nonetheless, without an opportunity to transition into a cyber job, this professional 
is unlikely to be one of them to stay in the Navy. 
5. Tribal 
Finally, we return to tribal differences, most of which we articulate among the 
dissatisfiers above. We recapitulate and summarize them briefly here as well, but it is 
important to recall how our grouping of participants into these two tribes is rough and 
approximate, not exact and precise. The 1820 (Information Professional) participants, for 
instance, reflect many attributes and characteristics of both tribes, and hence do not fit 
neatly into either. Nonetheless, we accept such roughness and imprecision for the insights 
enabled in this qualitative analysis, and we leave any development of exact and precise 
groupings to future research. 
First, we identify unfair as a tribal difference in terms of perception. Indeed, 
among the four codes leading to induction of tribal as a second order, unfair is applied 
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most often. We note above, for instance, how some information communicators perceive 
an unfair bias against them (e.g., being shut out of cyber, losing billets to cyber), and, as 
another instance, how one participant perceives injustice with D-coded billets being given 
to people without PhDs. As a third instance, an intelligence officer perceives a lack of 
fairness in the recruiting process. 
This perceived unfairness arises in other contexts as well. P1603 (Oceanography), 
for instance, perceives the promotion and advancement process as biased. In a story about 
a “talented officer who left the Navy,” we learn: “He got out. He was doing well, but he 
knew that the person ahead of him in terms of seniority would get the good ranking, 
regardless of how well he performed. He saw the advancement system as unfair: timing 
and seniority are more important than talent.” Apparently this talented officer “talked 
about this extensively,” and our participant adds that “it's tacitly understood by everyone 
that whoever's up next for promotion is going to get the ‘good’ FITREP.” 
We note above also about how industry is a differential code across tribes. This 
pertains mostly to competition for talent, and although the cyber warriors discuss the 
allure of industry opportunities considerably, their information communicator 
counterparts mention industry much more concretely. In other words, whereas the former 
officers appear more to be thinking about leaving the Navy because of opportunities in 
industry, the latter officers appear more to be thinking about leaving because of 
dissatisfiers in the Navy. This links directly to the code opportunity. Those in the Cyber 
Warrior Tribe see much greater opportunity, both within the Navy and beyond, than their 
communicator counterparts do. Nonetheless, these same cyber warriors complain still 
about the lack of opportunity for command.  
Finally, although this issue is not between the different IWC tribes per se, it arises 
as IWC participants compare themselves to other warfare communities beyond the IWC. 
This pertains in particular to SWOs (Surface Warfare Officers) and in the contexts of 
both command opportunities and career guidance. We induce the new code community 
image to characterize this issue. 
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D. SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
In this section we summarize, synthesize and integrate our findings from above. 
We begin by building upon the qualitative data analysis pertaining to talent in the IWC, 
for this informs the first part of our research question directly: What constitutes talent in 
the IWC? We build then upon analysis pertaining to motivators and dissatisfiers, for this 
informs the second part of our research question: Why do some talented people choose to 
leave the Navy while others choose to stay in? Because the reasons for staying and 
leaving differ somewhat across IWC tribes, we integrate tribal analysis throughout this 
discussion. We turn then to the third part of our research question: How can we retain 
talent in the Navy? The short answer is to a) identify and reward talented people; and for 
them b) emphasize motivators and mitigate dissatisfiers. We finish this section with a 
short set of recommendations to address each significant retention risk identified through 
this analysis. 
1. Talent 
What constitutes talent in the IWC? For reference we recapitulate our summary 
interpretation of IWC talent through second order analysis from above. 
IWC talent appears to have a strong rooting in (IT) technical competence. 
However, it does not appear to correlate with rank—at least from the perspective of these 
(O3 & O4) participants. Indeed, beyond a certain point, there appears to be an inverse 
correlation between rank and what our IWC participants view as talent. Technical 
competence as a central root of IWC talent renders many operational organizations into 
meritocracies, where the person best able to solve problems is encouraged and permitted 
to lead. Interestingly, our Strategic Contact likens this to SEAL and other special forces 
teams.  
This technical competence root of talent appears further to require considerable 
specialization, in addition to intelligence and experience, in order to get things done. 
Knowledge—much of it acquired before military service, but the rest learned principally 
on the job—is central to technical competence. This applies particularly as knowledge 
pertains to IT, but working effectively within a situated organization and environment 
appears to be important too, as talented people are able to sift through rules and 
constraints, think past SOPs, push beyond training, and be creative, all the while fitting 
in. Additionally, talent appears to involve people skills and communication also, with the 
ability to lead technical workers important in many organization contexts. This requires 
trust, as well as technological currency, and it appears that the most talented people in the 
IWC may not be the same ones who (are motivated to) emerge as IWC leaders. 
 
For the IWC as a whole, knowledge appears to drive most characterizations of 
talent. Technical knowledge is required for technical competence, which represents a 
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central root of IWC talent. Hence our grounded understanding of IWC talent must begin 
with technical knowledge. However, such knowledge is not unidimensional and centered 
solely on technical competence. Rather, technical knowledge and competence are situated 
within technical organizations where people are required to lead, communicate and fit in. 
This situated nature of knowledge varies a bit across IWC tribes. 
For the cyber tribe, for instance, other kinds of knowledge such as world 
understanding, people skills and communication are noted as important, but they do not 
appear to be commensurate with technical knowledge and “smart” people’s ability to “get 
things done” within cyberspace. In many respects, this central technical knowledge 
begins developing long before talented people enter the Navy, and hence this might 
represent an important characteristic for recruiters and detailers to examine. 
Notwithstanding the other, arguably important knowledge aspects of IWC talent, our 
interpretation is that technical cyberspace knowledge is central to talent in the Cyber 
Warrior Tribe. 
For the communicator tribe, as a complementary instance, the other kinds of 
knowledge noted above appear to be more prominent and hence important. Technical 
competence is central nonetheless, but perhaps not as singly so as in the cyber tribe, and 
it focuses more on information support systems than cyberspace per se. This represents 
one of the drivers for us to name this tribe “Information Communicator”: Communication 
and associated skills appear to have greater importance than in the cyber tribe. 
So what constitutes talent in the IWC? IT technical knowledge and the 
competence that it enables are fundamental, but we find nuanced differences between the 
cyber and communicator tribes. For the cyber warriors, IT technical knowledge and the 
ability to take effective actions within cyberspace are central to talent. For the 
communicators, technical system knowledge and the ability to communicate within the 
organization are key. For both tribes, talent does not appear to correlate positively with 
rank. 
2. Motivators and Dissatisfiers 
Why do some talented people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to 
stay in? For reference we recapitulate our summary interpretation of IWC motivators and 
dissatisfiers through second order analysis from above. 
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In terms of motivators, the enjoyment of one’s work, having fun on the job, 
making friendships, leading and mentoring sailors, serving one’s country and shipmates, 
and being passionate about what one does: These all serve as motivators that help to 
retain talent. Independence and autonomy are positive motivators also, as are challenge 
and the ability to have impact. Likewise, learning is important to most participants, as is 
problem solving, and having interesting and rewarding work is viewed quite favorably, 
even when people remain very busy and work very hard.  
Further, we find that pay and benefits serve as motivators for some, but others 
complain that the civilian sector offers much better pay and benefits. This may reflect 
some differences between IWC tribes. Likewise some participants note the adventure, 
changing jobs and locations, and learning something new every few years as 
motivational—particularly where more-senior officers provide mentorship and positive 
leadership—whereas others complain about job rotation frustrating their ability to 
specialize and pursue their passions, in addition to the disruption of family life by having 
to deploy and move frequently. Although the career switching costs appear to represent a 
(probably inadvertent) motivator that helps to retain talent, several participants complain 
about not being able to pursue their passions, about not being able to specialize and 
continue in jobs that they enjoy, and about quality of life issues that reduce motivation. 
Finally, more-senior officers—through their impact on both enjoyment and 
command opportunities—appear to play a major role in terms of motivation (and 
dissatisfaction). Mentorship and making a work environment enjoyable and rewarding 
exerts a very positive motivational influence. Alternatively, bosses who exhibit 
favoritism, who create a toxic work environment, and who limit opportunities for good 
experiences that enhance one’s chances of attaining command one day represent a major 
source of dissatisfaction, which we describe next. 
In terms of dissatisfiers, although those in the Cyber Warrior Tribe appear 
generally to enjoy what they do, many express dissatisfaction with having to leave fun 
jobs and serve in other roles. Alternatively, although many in the Information 
Communicator Tribe also express dissatisfaction with the need to rotate out of jobs that 
they are passionate about, a major source of frustration stems from what they view as an 
unfair bias against them. Quality of life issues emerge of course, and many participants 
compare their military jobs, careers and lives with counterparts in the civilian world. 
 
Motivators are relatively consistent across the IWC as a whole, as the enjoyment 
of one’s work seems paramount. Such enjoyment appears to be even more pronounced 
within the Cyber Warrior Tribe, however, as we detect levels of enthusiasm and feelings 
of adventure greater among cyber warriors than information communicators. Hence they 
may enjoy their jobs more, and this helps to set up the corresponding dissatisfier: 
rotation. In other words, since these cyber warriors appear to enjoy their cyber jobs so 
much—and they express a strong desire to specialize and continue working cyber jobs—
even a standard rotation is viewed negatively. This strikes us as a significant retention 
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risk, particularly given the demand for their knowledge and experience in the civilian 
sector. 
Participants within the Information Communicator Tribe appear to enjoy their 
work as well, but it is not as pronounced. Leadership and friendship, in addition to pay 
and benefits, appear to be more motivational to communicators, but some echo the cyber 
warriors’ dissatisfaction with rotation. Indeed, for participants in space and 
oceanography, for two instances, the opportunity to specialize would be viewed very 
positively, whereas the need to generalize is viewed negatively. As one participant notes, 
“the Navy is not going to make me a flag officer.” For some talented participants—who 
are not focused solely upon promotion and advancement—forcing them to generalize 
appears to be highly dissatisfying. This strikes us as another significant retention risk, 
particularly given the demand for their knowledge and experience in the civilian sector. 
We must note also how command and opportunity for advancement arises as both 
motivator and dissatisfier. In terms of motivation, many IWC participants—regardless of 
tribe—comment on how they seek command, yet most participants complain about the 
relative dearth of command opportunities, coupled with a comparative lack of career 
guidance. This is the case in particular as participants compare themselves with peers in 
the SWO and other communities, for this affects their community image. As talented 
people promote and compete for limited milestone and command jobs (esp. at O5 and 
even more so at O6), unless the enjoyment of one’s job can overcome the frustration with 
lack of advancement opportunities, we see a significant retention risk, particularly given 
the demand for their knowledge and experience in the civilian sector. 
Many participants, across both tribes, view their relationships with more-senior 
officers as highly important, and the nature of such relationships can be motivational or 
dissatisfying. It is difficult to assess how many “good” motivational bosses it might take 
to overcome the dissatisfaction of one “bad” one, or vice versa, but it seems that if 
participants are exposed repeatedly to dissatisfactory experiences induced by toxic 
leadership, then this will lead them to leave the Navy. This strikes us as a significant 
retention risk, to the extent that talented people are exposed repeatedly to bad bosses. 
Alternatively, this strikes us also as a significant retention motivator, to the extent that 
talented people are exposed repeatedly to good ones. 
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Finally, the familiar quality of life issues impact retention clearly. This is not a 
new story, but when talented people compare their quality of life in the Navy with what 
they could experience in the civilian sector, it represents a retention issue meriting 
ongoing study and consideration, particularly given the demand for IWC knowledge and 
experience in the civilian sector. 
So why do some talented people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to 
stay in? The enjoyment of one’s work is paramount, but we find nuanced differences 
between the cyber and communicator tribes. For the cyber warriors, who appear to enjoy 
their cyber jobs especially much, being able to specialize and continue with cyber jobs 
seems likely to keep them in the Navy, whereas the requirement to generalize and rotate 
into less enjoyable jobs seems likely instead to push them into the civilian sector. For the 
communicators, the opportunity to either specialize or reach command seems key to 
keeping them in the Navy, whereas if unable to do either, they seem likely instead to 
leave for civilian jobs. For both tribes, situated characteristics such as motivational versus 
toxic leaders and quality of life issues must balance with other motivational and 
dissatisfying factors. 
To summarize, we identify the four significant retention risks listed in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Significant Retention Risks 
Retention Risk Vulnerable Population 
Rotation out of cyber jobs Cyber warriors 
Generalization through job breadth Information communicators 
Dearth of command opportunities All IWC 
Repeated exposure to toxic leaders All IWC 
  
3. Talent Retention 
How can we retain talent in the Navy? The short answer is to a) identify and 
reward talented people; and for them b) emphasize motivators and mitigate dissatisfiers. 
Far from a glib response, we offer this sincerely and as a direct outcome of the preceding 
discussion. Through this study, we understand better now what constitutes talent in the 
IWC, and we see how it varies across tribes. This should enable us to identify talented 
IWC officers more easily, and hence to assess the relative retention risks associated with 
these talented people. Further, we also understand better the most important motivators 
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and dissatisfiers for IWC officers, which we can interrelate to both significant retention 
risk and vulnerable population. Thus, where we find talent and retention risk, we should 
act.  
4. Recommendations 
So what should we do? Our recommendations address each retention risk in turn. 
First, regarding the risk stemming from rotating cyber warriors out of cyber jobs, we 
could consider an alternate career path for talented officers who do not seek command. 
This could potentially be set up as a deliberate choice that a talented officer is allowed to 
make, through which he or she expressly indicates disinterest in command and accepts 
the likely result that O4 or O5 will be the highest rank achievable. In return, such officers 
would be permitted to “homestead” in cyber jobs—perhaps rotating across cyber 
billets—for the balance of their careers3. This could have three beneficial effects: 1) such 
homesteaded cyber officers would develop greater cyber knowledge, skill and 
experience; 2) the Navy would increase its ability to retain these talented people; and 3) 
the limited number of milestone and command billets—which represents another 
retention risk—would face less competition. Of course, much work would be required to 
implement a plan along these lines, and it is unclear what impact it would have upon the 
detailing process, but it could potentially help to keep talented information warriors from 
leaving the Navy. 
Our recommendation to address the second significant retention risk is similar. 
The only difference is that talented people who would prefer to become SMEs in some 
relatively narrow area (e.g., concentrate on space) outside of cyber would be permitted to 
make a deliberate choice to specialize and give up command opportunities. Indeed, our 
recommendation addressing cyber warriors above could be subsumed effectively into this 
idea, but clearly all of the same implementation details and unclear impacts would apply. 
As a note, in this study we look only at the IWC, but if other Navy warfare communities 
experience similar issues, then the kinds of recommendations proposed here could offer 
                                                 
33 Although this recommendation emerges through analysis of cyber warriors, it could potentially be 
applied broadly to other IWC tribes, and perhaps to other warfare communities across the Navy. The issue 
centers on how people’s job enjoyment contributes positively to their decisions to stay in the Navy. If 
talented people—even beyond the IWC—are given the option of “homesteading” in jobs that they enjoy, 
then they might become more likely to stay. 
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potential to address retention risks throughout the Navy. We leave this as a topic for 
future research. 
Third, regarding the risk stemming from the dearth of command opportunities, the 
recommendations above (i.e., an alternate career path for talented officers who do not 
seek command) could potentially limit competition for the limited number of milestone 
and command billets that are available. Moreover, we could look further at the number of 
people associated with various commands and consider breaking some very large 
commands into smaller parts. This could accommodate more officers seeking command. 
A related issue pertains to what some IWC participants view as unclear career guidance 
and pathways. We’re uncertain whether such participants simply do not understand the 
career progression—which implies that IWC leaders should endeavor to elaborate and 
explain it more clearly—or whether the relatively inchoate IWC could benefit from a 
more detailed and standardized career roadmap, similar to those enjoyed by SWOs, 
aviators and officers in other warfare communities. We leave this as a topic for future 
research also. 
Finally, regarding the risk stemming from repeated exposure to toxic leaders, 
command climate surveys represent a good start to identifying leaders who dissatisfy 
people in their organizations, and perhaps a portion of every leader’s fitness report should 
include a specific element to summarize command climate survey results. This is very 
similar to how university professors are evaluated in terms of teaching: Professors assign 
grades to students based upon their performance on exams and other coursework, but 
students also assign course evaluations to professors based on their perceptions of 
teaching efficacy. Additionally, since we seek to focus in particular upon talented IWC 
personnel, once they have been identified, perhaps we could explore avenues for giving 
them access to more-senior officers above their direct superiors. Although this risks 
interrupting the unitary chain of command in some respects, such access could be limited 
only to infrequent and important issues (e.g., career guidance, extreme grievance). The 
idea is to address and correct toxic leadership before it can dissatisfy a multitude of 
talented people.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Navy Information Warfare Community (IWC) provides a vital, sophisticated 
capability to address increasingly dynamic and unpredictable threats around the world. 
The problem is, the same skills and capabilities that make IWC personnel so valuable to 
the Navy also make them valuable to myriad firms in industry and organizations 
elsewhere beyond the Services. Moreover, such skills and capabilities are directly 
transferrable to industry. As a result, many talented information warriors are leaving the 
Service at the midpoints of their military careers. Indeed, nearly half of our study 
participants indicate that they are likely to leave the Service when the next opportunity 
arises. 
Further, unlike other Navy communities (e.g., Aviation, Nuclear), in which clear 
career guidance and well-established incentives (e.g., bonus and retention pay) are in 
place, the comparatively inchoate IWC does not appear to benefit similarly. A number of 
our IWC participants indicate that career guidance is inadequate, for instance, and some 
remain uncertain what to do next. Alternatively, other participants appear to understand 
what needs to be done next, but they express frustration at the limited number of 
opportunities for milestone tours and command. 
Given the unique nature of the IWC, it has not been entirely clear what “talent” 
means in this community. Through this study, however, we describe how talent is a 
highly situated and nuanced concept—far from general and monolithic—that is aligned 
with a person’s knowledge and capability within an organization setting. Indeed, we 
identify what constitutes talent in the IWC: IT technical knowledge and the competence 
that it enables are fundamental, but we find nuanced differences between the cyber and 
communicator tribes. For the cyber warriors, IT technical knowledge and the ability to 
take effective actions within cyberspace are central to talent. For the information 
communicators, technical system knowledge and the ability to communicate within the 
organization are key. For both tribes, talent does not appear to correlate positively with 
rank. 
Moreover, we articulate why some talented people choose to leave the Navy 
while others choose to stay in: The enjoyment of one’s work is paramount, but we find 
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nuanced differences between the cyber and communicator tribes. For the cyber warriors, 
who appear to enjoy their cyber jobs especially much, being able to specialize and 
continue with cyber jobs seems likely to keep them in the Navy, whereas the requirement 
to generalize and rotate into less enjoyable jobs seems likely instead to push them into the 
civilian sector. For the communicators, the opportunity to either specialize or reach 
command seems key to keeping them in the Navy, whereas if unable to do either, they 
seem likely instead to leave for civilian jobs. For both tribes, situated characteristics such 
as motivational versus toxic leaders and quality of life issues must balance with other 
motivational and dissatisfying factors. 
Thus, we identify four significant retention risks: 1) Rotation out of cyber jobs, 2) 
generalization through job breadth, 3) dearth of command opportunities, and 4) repeated 
exposure to toxic leaders. We then outline recommendations for retaining IWC talent. 
One recommendation is to propose an alternate career path for talented officers who do 
not seek command, one that would enable such officers to “homestead” in cyber and 
other jobs as specialists instead of generalists. This could potentially address the first two 
retention risks directly, and it could have an indirect effect on the third by reducing 
competition for the limited number of milestone and command billets. Another 
recommendation could consider breaking some very large commands into smaller parts, 
which would accommodate more officers seeking command. The final recommendation 
proposes to include command climate survey results on leaders’ fitness reports; to 
identify talented IWC personnel; and to grant them limited access to more-senior officers 
above their direct superiors. 
Of course, much work would be required to implement recommendations along 
these lines, and it is unclear what impact they would have upon the detailing process, 
morale, perceived fairness, recruiting, the chain of command and other areas, and we 
leave the answers to such questions as topics for future research. Nonetheless, they offer 
potential to help keep talented information warriors from leaving the Navy. 
Understanding talent represents the first step toward identifying and retaining the 
best IWC people before they leave the Service. This qualitative study addresses the issue 
directly, building up a grounded understanding of IWC talent and identifying both 
positive and negative issues driving talented people’s decisions to leave or stay in the 
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Navy. Results elucidate unique aspects of IWC talent and retention, in addition to 
attributes and issues that information warriors share with other Service members, and 
they highlight opportunities for Navy leaders to address talent and retention in the IWC 
and beyond. The next step is to inform the IWC leadership of these results and to offer 
assistance in terms of analyzing alternate courses of action. Beyond that, we envision 
excellent opportunity to apply this same, grounded study method to other Navy warfare 
communities that may have problems with retaining talented officers, in addition to 
enlisted people, and can foresee the Navy leading the way for our other military services 
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APPENDIX A – RECRUITMENT SCRIPT 
This is the script used to recruit volunteers to participate in the study. 
 
Hello, [Senior IWC officer] referred me to you and other 18XX officers here at NPS 
regarding a qualitative study that I’m leading to gain insight into how to treat and retain 
talented officers in the Information Warfare Community. Through consultation with 
OPNAV N1, we have identified this community as particularly important and dynamic at 
present, and our conversations with the Information Warfare Center of Excellence suggest 
that it could benefit from improvements in how it assigns, promotes and retains talented 
officers. When you have a convenient opportunity, kindly let me know if we could set up a 
time to chat—either in person or by telephone, Skype or like means—for a half hour or so. 
Your input will be anonymous, and nothing in our report will identify you in any way. 
Indeed, I will shred the participant list when the study is complete, so you are welcomed 
and encouraged to be candid. We’re looking for information and insight from within the 
community, and the timing looks good in terms of interest at N1. 
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration. Please let me know if you have any questions 
or concerns. 
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APPENDIX B – BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire is used to collect background information prior to interviews. 
 
Background Data  
Please fill in as many fields as you are able. Your information will remain confidential. 
 
1. Date of Commissioning (YYMM): _______ 
 
2. Commissioning source  (check field that applies):  
USNA __ ROTC __ OCS_OTS  __    Direct __    Other Commissioning Source ____  
 
3. Prior Enlisted (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
4. Undergraduate College attended: _________________ 
 
5. Year of graduation from college (YYMM): ______ 
 
6. College Major:___________________ 
 
7. Undergraduate GPA: _____  
 
8. Do you hold a graduate degree?  (check field that applies):   
 Yes __  No ___  .  If Yes, in what major (specialty) ? ______ 
 
9. Rate at commissioning: _______________ 
 
10. Designator at entry (check the field that applies): SWO ___  Submarine ___ Special 
Warfare/EOD ___ Aviator ___ RL ___ Staff____ ; If RL, what designator code?____ 
 
11. Married, at commissioning date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
12. Dependent children, at commissioning date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
13. Married, at current date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
14. Dependent children, at current date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
  
15. Current rate: _____  
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APPENDIX C – COMMON INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
All participants are asked these 10 questions to provide a common basis.  
 
Research Interview Questions 
 
Introduction 
“Thank you again for participating in the study on retaining talent in the Information 
Warrior Community. You were identified among a pool of NPS information warrior 
students, and I selected you along with several others for your potential to inform our 
study well. As a note, your comments will be kept anonymous, no personal details about 
you will appear in the study report or briefings, and only you and I will know that you 
participated in the study. Once you sign the consent form, I’ll ask you a few relatively 
open ended questions, which I hope that you’ll answer candidly. The interview should 
take 30 to 45 minutes, but we can go longer if you wish. Do you have any questions? Are 
you ready to begin?” 
General Questions (presuming all subjects are Navy service members still) 
1. What led you to join the Navy? 
2. Can you tell me about how your career has progressed to this point? 
3. What was your last assignment, and where do you hope to be assigned next? 
4. What do you like most about your work in the Navy? What do you like least? 
5. When is your next decision point regarding whether to stay in the Navy or not? 
6. What factors are pulling you to stay in the Navy, and what are pulling you away? 
7. At this point, do you anticipate staying in or leaving the Navy? Why? 
8. What if anything would have to be different for you to change your mind? 
9. Is there anything else that you can tell me to help understand your motivation? 
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